Ad-Valorem Taxes, Prices and Content Diversification in the News Market
[ad_1]
1. Introduction
In this scenario, the question is if government policy, like taxes on newspapers, can be used to help the media sector to face these challenges. The idea of the special tax treatment is twofold. First, can lower taxes on newspapers help news firms to be able to reduce prices to readers and therefore increase the sales of newspapers (both print and online)? Second, can lower taxes on newspapers free revenues that newspapers can use to invest in content, and therefore increase media diversity in the news market?
In this paper, we then analyze the role of ad-valorem taxes when applied to the two sides of the news market: ad-valorem taxes on the selling of news; and ad-valorem taxes on the selling of advertising. We are interested on the effects of these two taxes on the prices of news and on media diversity. In particular, we try to answer the following two questions:
- (1)
-
Can lower ad-valorem taxes (on the selling of news and on the selling of advertising) conduce to lower prices in the media sector?
- (2)
-
Can lower ad-valorem taxes (on the selling of news and on the selling of advertising) promote firms to increase the diversity of content that they offer?
Second, when we allow firms to diversify content, ad-valorem taxes on selling of news do not anymore always increase the prices of news relatively to the no taxes scenario. This will depend on consumer’s preference for their ideal variety. Accordingly, if consumers have a strong preference for their ideal variety, ad-valorem taxes on selling of news increases prices relatively to the case with no taxes.
Third, we show that both ad-valorem taxes on selling of news and ad-valorem taxes on selling of advertising reduce content diversification by firms, reducing therefore media diversity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature in the field. Then, we present the theoretical model. After, we look to the case with no content diversification for the benchmark case with no taxation, then with ad-valorem taxes on the selling of news, and with ad-valorem taxes on the selling of advertising. Then, we consider the case with content diversification for the benchmark case with no taxation, then with ad-valorem taxes on the selling of news, and the with ad-valorem taxes on the selling of advertising. We close the paper by first discussing our results and then concluding.
2. Literature Review
We extend this view of media diversity by considering the effects of taxes on media firms’ incentives to diversify content. The more content a media firm supplies the market, more content diversity, and vice-versa. The idea is that in what concerns media diversity, it is not only important how many sources consumers access, but also how much content each media firms supply the market.
3. The Model
Case 1. No Content Diversification and No Ad-Valorem Taxes. This case is used as a benchmark to compare with the taxation cases 2 and 3, in what respects the effects of taxes on prices.
Case 4. Content Diversification and No Ad-Valorem Taxes. This case is used as a benchmark to compare with the taxation cases 5 and 6, in what respects the effects of taxes now both in terms of prices and content diversification.
Case 6. Content Diversification and Ad-Valorem Taxes on Selling of Advertisement. The objective of this case is to look to the effects of taxes on selling of advertising on content diversification and prices.
where is a parameter that captures the informational and flexibility costs to adapt to the consumers’ preferences.
where is the price of advertising per reader, is the advertising volume. The parameters and reflect the size of the advertising market. Accordingly, a high and a low represent a large advertising market. Then as in Anderson and Coate [22], media firms extract all surplus from advertisers. Gross advertising income, though, depends on if consumers single-home or multi-home. We return to this in the next sub-sections dedicated to single-homing and multi-homing.
In the following, we present our model with no ad-valorem taxes for the single-homing and multi-homing case and at the end we show how the model changes with the introduction of ad-valorem taxes (on selling of news and on selling of advertisement). We present then the model in an encompassing way that can include all the cases mentioned above. When we later solve for each case, we mention how the case in question differs from the encompassing model.
3.1. Single-Homing
where v is the reservation price of consumers, t transport costs, () diversity of content offered by firm i. Remember that the superscript S stands for single-homing. Note that in the no content diversification cases (cases 1 to 3 above), ().
where is the demand for media firm i under single-homing. In this sense, the indifferent consumer between buying from L and R equals, . In turn the indifferent consumer between buying from R and L equals . Figure 1 depicts the indifferent consumer under single-homing. It can be shown that the indifferent consumer under single-homing is the one that makes:
Again note that in the no content diversification cases (cases 1 to 3), (). Solving for x in the previous equation, we obtain the indifferent consumer, for firm L and for firm R.
3.2. Multi-Homing
where d represents the loss of utility due to overlap of content by consuming from the two media firms. Remember that the superscript M stands for multi-homing.
Therefore, is the indifferent consumer between buying only from L or from both L and R.
With and .
3.3. Taxation of Selling of News and Advertising
As we have mentioned above, to consider the effects of taxation on content diversification in a two-sided market, we consider two cases: with no taxation (see above) and with ad-valorem taxes on selling of news and on selling of advertising. The only difference between taxation and no taxation case is on what concerns revenues from selling news and from selling advertising.
Next, we derive the equilibrium of the different cases.
Method
4. No Content Diversification and No Ad-Valorem Taxes
In this section, we consider the case with no taxes. This means that we have the model above without content diversification (i.e., , ). This can be considered a benchmark case that we will use later to compare with the taxation cases. We start with the single-homing case and then turn to the multi-homing case.
4.1. Single-Homing
4.2. Multi-Homing
We now turn to multi-homing case. We start again with the indifferent consumer. As noted above, in the multi-homing case, we have two indifferent consumers.
Solving the FOCs for advertising levels, we get the same levels of advertising as under single-homing, .
As for the FOCs for advertising, prices of the rival do not enter the FOCs for prices. This is as we have just explained because multi-homing reduces price competition.
5. No Content Diversification and Ad-Valorem Taxes on Selling of News
5.1. Single-Homing
The first thing to note is that the indifferent consumer under ad-valorem taxes on selling of news is the same as with no taxation above. Note also that FOCs for advertising are the same under taxation and no taxation. Then, advertising levels are also the same.
5.2. Multi-Homing
We turn now to the multi-homing case. Again, the indifferent consumers under multi-homing with ad-valorem taxes on selling of news are the same as for the no taxation case above. We can also see that FOCs for advertising under ad-valorem taxes on selling of news are the same as above with no taxation. Then once again we get the same levels of advertising levels.
Again, relatively to single-homing case, prices for the rival firm do not enter the FOCs for prices. The reasons for this are the same as pointed out above for the no taxation case: multi-homing reduces competition, since consumers buy from all firms.
5.3. Taxation versus No Taxation
6. No Content Diversification and Ad-Valorem Taxes on Selling of Advertisement
In this section, we introduce ad-valorem taxes on advertising (but continue to not consider content diversification). Again, we first look to the case with single-homing consumers and then look to the case with multi-homing consumers. After, we compare this case with taxation with the case above with no taxation.
6.1. Single-Homing
The first thing to note is that the indifferent consumer is again the same as for the no taxation case.
Solving for and , we get the same advertising levels as with no taxation, i.e., .
6.2. Multi-Homing
Once more, the indifferent consumers under multi-homing are the same as under the no taxation case above.
Note again that under multi-homing prices of the rival do not enter the FOCs for advertising. This results for the same reason pointed out previously: under multi-homing, consumers buy from all firms and therefore price competition is reduced.
Once more under multi-homing prices of the rival do not enter the FOCs for prices. As we have already said, this is because multi-homing reduces price competition.
6.3. Taxation versus No Taxation
7. Content Diversification and No Ad-Valorem Taxes
We now in addition to price competition consider also content competition, and allow therefore firms to diversify content, i.e., , . We start with the no taxation case to have a benchmark to compare afterwards with the cases of taxation (ad-valorem taxes on selling of news and ad-valorem taxes on selling of advertising). Again, we consider first the case with single-homing and then multi-homing.
7.1. Single-Homing
Solving for and , we get the same levels of advertising as with no content diversification, .
We can then see that the direct effect of content diversification on demand of the media firm is positive. Accordingly, more content increases demand for the media firm. In turn, the indirect effect is negative. Accordingly, more content increases price competition, i.e., it reduces the price of the rival, which has in turn a negative effect on the demand of the media firm. Even so, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, and more content diversification has therefore a total positive impact on the demand for the media firm.
Then, content diversification increases with the intensity of consumers preferences for their ideal variety (t) and decreases with the costs to provide content ().
7.2. Multi-Homing
With multi-homing, the first thing to note, as shown above, is that there are two indifferent consumers, one for media firm L () and another for media firm R (). Where is the indifferent consumer between buying only from L or from both L and R, and is the indifferent consumer between buying only from R or from both R and L.
where:
where is as above and equals:
We can then see that now under multi-homing, it is not only prices of the rival that do not enter the FOCs for advertising but also content diversification of the rival. This shows that multi-homing reduces competition not only price, but also on content diversification. Again, this results from the fact that multi-homing reduces competition, since readers that multi-home buy from both newspapers, and therefore firms do not need to compete for these consumers.
Solving for and , we get the same advertising levels as under single-homing, .
We can see again that the FOCs for prices under multi-homing differ from the single-homing case, since now prices and content diversification of the rival do not enter the FOCs. This shows once more that multi-homing softens competition, not only on prices but also for content diversification. This is so, as we have already said, since when consumers multi-home (i.e., they consume from all the firms), competition for consumers is softened.
We can then see that, as in the single homing case, the direct effect of content diversification on demand of the media firm is positive. Accordingly, more content increases demand for the media firm. However now under multi-homing this occurs since the indirect effect is canceled. This is so because as we have mentioned above, multi-homing reduces competition for readers that multi-home, since these consume from the two media firms, and therefore firms do not need to compete for them.
Then, we have that the content diversification of the rival does not enter the FOCs for content diversification, showing once again that multi-homing reduces competition not just on prices but also on content provision.
8. Content Diversification and Ad-Valorem Taxes on Selling of News
8.1. Single-Homing
We now derive the equilibrium condition of the single-homing case with ad-valorem taxes on selling of news when firms invest in content. The first thing to note is that the indifferent consumer is the same as under no taxation.
It can also be seen that the First Order Conditions (FOCs) in relation to () under taxation are the same as in the no taxation case. Then advertising levels under taxation and no taxation are also equal.
8.2. Multi-Homing
In this sub-section, we look to the case of multi-homing with ad-valorem taxes on selling of news. The first thing to note is that the indifferent consumers for firm L and firm R in the taxation scenario are the same as in the no taxation case.
The second thing to note is that the FOCs for advertising volumes, () under taxation are also equal to the FOCs under no taxation. As a result, advertising levels under multi-homing with taxation are also the same, .
As for the no taxation case under multi-homing, with taxation, the FOCs for prices under multi-homing differ from ones under the single-homing case, since now prices and content diversification of the rival do not enter the FOCs. This results from the fact that, as we have already said previously, multi-homing reduces competition on both prices and content, since multi-home consumers consume from the two media firms.
We can show that the direct effect and the indirect effect under the taxation case are equal to the no taxation case. Then as for the no taxation case, multi-homing softens price competition.
Note again that content diversification of the rival does not enter the FOCs of the firm in relation to content diversification. As we have mentioned, this is due to the fact that multi-homing reduces competition, not only on prices, but also on content provision.
8.3. Taxation versus No Taxation
We can now compare the effects of taxation on prices and content diversification. Start with the single-homing-case.
Taxation then unambiguously reduces content diversification of media firms. This then puts into light that content diversification is more than just a question of single-homing and multi-homing (demand side) but also about how much media firms provide of content (supply side). In this sense, under single-homing, ad-valorem taxes on selling of news can be positive for prices but are negative for media plurality.
We then have the same result under single homing and multi-homing: taxation reduces content diversification. Again, what we can take from this result is that we cannot see media plurality just in terms of single-homing (buying from one media firm, just having access to one news source) and multi-home (buying from two media firms, having access to two news source), but also how much diversity of content media firms provide to the market. Furthermore, while the effect of ad-valorem taxes on selling of news can be ambiguous, the effect on content diversification is always negative, since taxes always decrease content provision.
9. Content Diversification and Ad-Valorem Taxes on Selling of Advertisement
In this section, we look to the case with ad-valorem taxes on selling of advertising when firms can diversify content. We again start with the single-homing case, then look to the multi-homing case. We close this section by comparing the no taxation and the taxation case in what respects prices and content diversification.
9.1. Single-Homing
The first thing to note is that the indifferent consumer with taxes on advertisement under single-homing is again the same as with no taxation.
Solving for and , we get the same advertising values as in the no taxation case, .
It can be shown that the direct effect and the indirect effect are the same as above with no taxation. Therefore the (positive) direct effect dominates the (negative) indirect effect. Then, the FOCs for advertising under taxation and under no taxation are also the same. This means that under single-homing, content diversification under taxation and no taxation are equal, . In other words, ad-valorem taxes on advertising do not affect content provision in the market.
9.2. Multi-Homing
Again, with multi-homing, prices and content diversification of the rival do not show up in the FOCs for advertising. This results from multi-homing reducing competition. Solving for and we get the same advertising values as in the no taxation case, .
Note once more that multi-homing reduces competition on prices and content, since prices and content of the rival do not come up in the FOCs for prices.
It can be easily shown that the direct and indirect effect are equal to the no taxation case. Then again content diversification increases demand of a media firm.
Once more with multi-homing, content diversification of the rival does not show up in the FOCs for content diversification. As mentioned several times now, this results from the fact that multi-homing reduces competition.
9.3. Taxation versus No Taxation
Then, taxation of advertising under single-homing has no effects on content diversification.
Since the SOC for content diversification demands that , then there is more content diversification (and therefore more media plurality) with no taxation. Then in spite of the fact that with multi-homing prices are no longer always lower with no taxation, we still have that content diversification is always higher with no taxation.
10. Discussion of Results
In this paper, we have analyzed the effects of ad-valorem taxes (on selling of news and on selling of advertising) on prices and content diversification. The motivation for this exercise comes from two fronts. First, the Internet has brought new challenges to the media sector. Accordingly, the migration of content from printed newspapers to online news, has reduced newspapers revenues from printed newspapers (subscriptions and sales of printed newspapers and advertising revenues from printed editions). In addition, the online business of newspapers has not yet compensated for the revenue losses from printed editions. This is so because online many news items are free, and newspapers face fierce competition for advertising revenues from online giants such as Google and Facebook.
The question that we analyzed in this paper is if tax policy for newspapers can help them to face these challenges. In particular, if lower ad-valorem taxes on the selling of news and on the selling of advertising can reduce prices for consumers in order to increase demand for news, and free revenues that newspapers can use to increase content provision and therefore increase media plurality in the news market.
We have argued that since the media market is a two-sided market (it sells news to consumers and advertising to advertisers), looking just at taxes on the selling of news does not give the full picture and we should also look to the taxes on the selling of advertising. Furthermore, we have argued that media diversity is not only about single-homing (buying just one newspaper, i.e., have access to one news source) and multi-homing (buying different competing newspapers, i.e., having access to different news sources), but also the diversity of content offered by each newspaper.
Finally, we have not performed a full analysis of the effects on social welfare. We have not done this due to space restrictions and because we think that the results are straightforward from the analysis above. Accordingly, we can easily see that taxes affect the profitability of firms and consumer surplus since it affects prices and content diversification. Consumers benefit with lower prices and more content diversity. Firms can benefit with higher prices if higher prices do not reduce demand. Firms can also benefit with higher consumer diversity since this increases demand.
In what respects taxes, we can say that taxes are unambiguously negative for content diversification and therefore are negative for consumers and for firms. Taxes impact on prices, however, depend on, as we have shown, if taxes are on the selling of news or on the selling of advertising. Taxes on the selling of news can reduce or increase prices. So, the effects on consumer surplus, profits and social welfare can go both ways. In turn, taxes on the selling of advertising tend to increase prices. As we have seen above, this can be positive or negative for firms (depending on if it decreases demand from consumers), but it is always negative for consumers.
11. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that effects of ad-valorem taxes on prices and content diversity depends on if we consider ad-valorem taxes on selling of news or ad-valorem taxes on the selling of advertising. In particular, ad-valorem taxes on the selling of news can contribute to fiercer price competition (and therefore lower prices) and as a result promote multi-homing by consumers, which is positive to media diversity. In turn, ad-valorem taxes on the selling of advertising can conduce to higher prices, since firms need to compensate for the reduction in advertising revenues, and in this way force consumers to single-home, reducing media diversity. The reason for this different result is that ad-valorem taxes on selling of advertising does not affect price competition but reduces advertising revenues which media firms try to recover with higher prices of newspapers.
Another contribution of this paper was to show that when we look to media diversity, we should consider not only how many news sources a consumer has access to (single-homing versus multi-homing), but also the diversity of content that each media firm supplies the market. In order to investigate this, we have also look to the incentives of firms to diversify content when they face ad-valorem taxes on selling of news and ad-valorem taxes on selling of advertising. In this respect, we have found the following. First, if firms can diversify content, ad-valorem taxes on selling of news do not anymore unambiguously increase prices. This will depend on consumers’ intensity of preferences for their ideal variety. Accordingly, if consumers have a strong preference for their ideal variety, prices can be lower in the no taxation scenario relatively to the scenario with ad-valorem taxes on selling of news. This is so because when consumers have a strong preference for their ideal variety, price competition increases.
Second, we show that both ad-valorem taxes on selling of news and ad-valorem taxes on selling of advertising reduces content diversification in the media market relatively to the no taxation case. The reason for this is that to diversify content is costly, and taxation of advertising, by reducing advertising revenues, also reduces firms’ capacity to finance content diversification. This shows that even in the cases where ad-valorem taxes reduce prices (i.e., with ad-valorem taxes on selling of news) promoting consumers to multi-home, media diversity can even so be reduced, because media firms decrease content diversification in the media market.
In this sense, this paper put forward results that are both new in the literature in media economics and have clear policy implications. In terms of the novelty, to the best of our knowledge, we were the first to look to taxes on the selling of advertising. The other papers in the literature have looked only to taxes on the selling of news. The importance of doing this is that, as we have discussed above, taxes on the selling of news and taxes on the selling of advertising have different impacts in the news market, in terms of prices (demand for news) and content provision. In addition, the literature on the field has looked to media diversity just in terms if consumers single-home (i.e., have access to just one source of news) or multi-home (i.e., have access to more than one source of news). We instead argue that media diversity is also about the diversity of content that each media firm provides the market.
[ad_2]