Arctic Climate Science: A Way Forward for Cooperation through the Arctic Council and Beyond

Introduction

The Arctic is warming three to four times faster than the rest of the globe. Various feedback mechanisms are accelerating climate change in the High North, yet uncertainties about these processes hinder our ability to anticipate the most likely trajectories for global warming. What are the impacts of increased Arctic wildfires? As snow and ice in the Arctic disappear, how much solar heat will be absorbed versus reflected back into the atmosphere? What effects will that have on Arctic ecosystems? How well do we understand the relationship between melting ice sheets and global sea level rise? Could Arctic permafrost thaw one day release as much greenhouse gas as China or the United States emit now?¹ If so, what does that mean for global carbon budgets?

These questions point to complex, dynamic, non-linear processes that must be understood to mitigate their direct role in accelerating climate change. Arctic climate research is critical for informing the adaptation and mitigation efforts of local communities and those at the national, regional, and global levels.

Climate science to examine these changing dynamics takes place via various institutions and fora. Since 1996, the Arctic Council has served as the primary forum for Arctic states (Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, United States), Arctic Indigenous Peoples, non-Arctic states, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and experts to understand Arctic climate change and its impacts on the Arctic cryosphere. This cooperation has generated essential knowledge to inform regional and global policymaking.

But Arctic climate research is in jeopardy following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Much of the information sharing between Russian and Western scientists has ground to a halt. A recently-published study suggests that the lack of cooperation between the West and Russia biases data to such an extent that scientists may be unable to accurately describe future Arctic change.² Essential  data is still being shared under the auspices of international agreements, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, and remote sensing technology can detect some environmental shifts. However, these data sources lack the specificity required to gain the depth of understanding needed to comprehend complex climate processes and have limited value for measuring phenomena, such as permafrost thaw and wildfires, taking place in the Russian Arctic. Russia makes up more than half of the Arctic coastline, and 65% of its landmass rests on permafrost. Russia cannot be ignored when determining how climate change will impact the Arctic, and how those impacts will reverberate across the globe.³

The freeze in climate science cooperation through the Arctic Council came on the heels of two years of reduced activity due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  As a result, the Council has fostered minimal working-level cooperation in recent years. In August 2023, Arctic states agreed to a resumption of cooperation through the Council via “written procedures,” an onerous process that has moved slowly and has not enabled the dialogue necessary to advance more complex scientific and policy issues. For example, there has been little room for the strategic discussions needed to align the efforts of the Arctic Council and international bodies like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to understand the Arctic’s influence on global warming.

In February 2024, the Arctic Council announced that it had reached consensus on new operating guidelines that allow its Working Groups to convene virtual meetings. These guidelines could provide a means to enable dialogue, reach timely consensus on more complex issues, and advance projects after a period of relative inactivity. The Council will gradually resume Working Group meetings over the next three to four months and will be able to invite Observer states and organizations back into working-level discussions and activities.